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A Perfect Storm: Mercury and the Bush Administration, Part II
by Lisa Heinzerling and Rena I. Steinzor
The Storm Continues
In December 2003, the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) proposed a rule to control mercury emissions
from power plants and issued a final rule for mercury from
chlor-alkali facilities. For power plants, EPA offered a
mélange of proposals, while making clear that it strongly
prefers to allow commercial trading in this toxic substance,
imposing only minimal, long-delayed additional controls
for mercury.1 For chlor-alkali facilities,2 EPA announced it
simply did not know where as much as 65 tons of mercury
(more than the mercury now emitted by all of the power
plants in the country) 3 had gone—“somewhat of an
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1. Proposed National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; and, in the Alternative, Proposed Standards of Performance for
New and Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Steam-Generating Units; Proposed Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. 4652 (Jan. 30, 2004) [hereinafter Proposed Power Plant Rule]. Although EPA first announced
its proposal in December 2003, it did not publish the proposal in the
Federal Register until January 30, 2004. EPA subsequently published a supplemental notice setting forth a model rule for its trading
alternative. Supplemental Notice for the Proposed National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; and, in the Alternative,
Proposed Standards of Performance for New and Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Steam-Generating Units; Proposed
Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. 12398 (Mar. 16, 2004) [hereinafter Proposed
Power Plant Rule Supplemental Notice].
2. Chlor-alkali facilities produce chlorine and caustic soda. Caustic
soda (sodium hydroxide) is “an essential ingredient in an array of industrial operations, including pulp and paper, textiles, soap and detergents, bleach, petroleum products and alumina, along with many
other uses in the chemical processing industry.” See http://www.
dow.com/causticsoda/index.htm.
3. EPA estimates that coal-fired utility units emit approximately 48
tons of mercury per year. Proposed Power Plant Rule, supra note 1,
at 4691.
4. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Mercury
Emissions From Mercury Cell Chlor-Alkali Plants; Final Rule, 68
Fed. Reg. 70904, 70920 (Dec. 19, 2003) [hereinafter Final Chlor-Alkali Rule].

fathered the nine old chlor-alkali facilities that still use mercury as an input to production.5
In the first installment of this two-part series, we argued
that four powerful pressure systems—a “perfect storm,”6
we said—should have combined to avoid these unhappy results.7 Science, law, economics, and justice all pointed
clearly in the direction of swift and stringent controls on
mercury emissions. In that Article, we focused on science
and law, first canvassing the large scientific consensus concerning the threats posed by mercury and then detailing the
legal problems with EPA’s actions. Since we wrote the Article, our discussion of the risks of mercury has gained even
greater currency with the issuance of a new advisory by EPA
and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), which for the
first time8 warns pregnant women, women of child-bearing
age, and their children about the mercury-related risks of
eating that great American staple, canned tuna.9
In this Article, we turn to economics and environmental
justice. These analytical frameworks reveal other, equally
troubling problems with EPA’s decisions on mercury.
With respect to economics, EPA’s own analysis of its
mercury proposals documented net benefits (benefits minus costs) of $13 billion from the regulation of power
plants—even without any calculation of the independent
benefits of reducing the adverse health effects caused by
mercury exposure, e.g., neurological injury to babies and
children. The benefits that were quantified and monetized
5. Id. at 70918 (categorizing chlor-alkali plants in such a way as to allow mercury cell plants to continue using their outmoded technology). Since our first Article was written, the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (NRDC) has sued to overturn the rule on chlor-alkali plants. For NRDC’s press release on the lawsuit, see http://www.
nrdc.org/media/pressreleases/040217.asp.
6. Several readers of the first Article in this series, Lisa Heinzerling &
Rena I. Steinzor, A Perfect Storm: Mercury and the Bush Administration, 34 ELR 10297 (Apr. 2004), have suggested that the real
“perfect storm,” made famous by Sebastian Junger’s book and the
movie based on it, consisted of three, not four, weather systems, contrary to our account. Bob Case, the now-retired National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) meteorologist who gave
the storm its famous name, seems to count four weather systems that
contributed to the event, and we relied upon his count in our first
piece. See NOAA, NOAA Meteorologist Bob Case, The Man Who
Named the Perfect Storm, at http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories/
s444.htm. In any case, we are pleased to have such careful readers.
7. Heinzerling & Steinzor, supra note 6, at 10297-98.
8. See http://www.epa.gov/ost/fishadvice/factsheet.html#diff.
9. U.S. EPA & FDA, Joint Federal Advisory for Mercury in
Fish: What You Need to Know About Mercury in Fish and
Shellfish (2004), available at http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/
fishadvice/advice.html.
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were a regulatory windfall: they were the “co-benefits” associated with reducing sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen
oxide (NOx), two air pollutants that are otherwise regulated
under new EPA rules issued around the same time as the
mercury proposal.10 EPA claimed these co-benefits in the
context of its mercury rule proposals because reducing SO2
and NOx under those other rules will also result in reductions—as yet unquantified—of mercury emissions.11 Unfortunately, EPA’s calculations tend to obscure the single
most remarkable fact about its mercury proposals: none
of the alternatives EPA suggests with respect to mercury
require utilities to do anything more to control mercury
than they are doing already to control SO2 and NOx. Only
in 2018—at the earliest—will mercury-specific control
requirements kick in, at which time, under EPA’s proposed trading alternative, total allowable emissions are reduced further.
Thirteen billion dollars is, as these things go, a whopper of a net benefit. Yet the public record reveals that no
one—neither EPA officials nor the supposedly cost-benefit-minded economists at the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB)—asked whether we might get an even more
wonderful cost-benefit profile if we regulated mercury
more stringently. Indeed, EPA officials ordered career personnel at the Agency not to perform the kind of scientific
and economic analysis usually performed for this kind of
rule.12 And the dominant concern of the “efficiency” hawks
at OMB appears to have been to make the risks of mercury
appear as low as possible.
We tell the same sad story when justice is the theme. In offering its proposal to allow commercial trading in mercury
emissions, EPA violated several of the most basic principles
for designing an effective and enforceable trading regime.
Allowing trading in a toxic substance makes practically inevitable the creation of dangerous hot spots that threaten the
health of neighborhoods around the plants. Compounding
this overriding problem, the “cap” EPA proposes to set on
total emissions is exceedingly generous, requiring no new,
mercury-specific controls until 2018 at the very earliest. By
allowing unlimited banking of emissions credits, the
Agency has shot holes through even that supposedly “certain, fixed”13 albeit overly generous cap, with the embarrassing result that under the Agency’s own modeling, it may
be 2026 until mercury emissions are reduced to one-half as
much as they are now. The weakness of the Agency’s trading proposal was cast in sharp relief by the findings of a recently released analysis by EPA’s Office of Research and
Development (ORD) showing that technologies capable of
achieving 70-90% reductions will be available as early as
2010.14 The trading regime EPA proposes to create is, quite
10. Rule to Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and
Ozone (Interstate Air Quality Rule); Proposed Rule, 69 Fed. Reg.
4566 (Jan. 30, 2004) [hereinafter Interstate Air Quality Rule].
11. Because it is so flummoxed about what numerical reductions in mercury to expect from the SO2 and NOX rules, EPA is unable to establish the Phase I cap for mercury in its trading rule proposals. See discussion at infra notes 83, 84 and accompanying text.
12. Tom Hamburger & Alan C. Miller, Mercury Emissions Rule Geared
to Benefit Industry, Staffers Say, L.A. Times, Mar. 16, 2004 [hereinafter Hamburger & Miller].
13. Proposed Power Plant Rule, supra note 1, at 4701.
14. Steve Cook, Developing Technology Could Help Cut Mercury by 70
Percent, EPA Research Says, Env’t Rep. (BNA), Mar. 26, 2004, at
645 [hereinafter Developing Technology].

simply, a disaster waiting to happen, and its deep problems
unfortunately threaten to undermine the case for emissions
trading in other, more promising and appropriate contexts.
In short, EPA has brushed aside the clear implications of
economics and justice just as casually as it brushed aside the
implications of science and law. Blasted by a barrage of criticism labeling these proposals (among other things) as the
“next arsenic,”15 faced with news accounts documenting extensive industry influence on EPA’s explanation of its proposal for power plants,16 and embarrassed by the contradictions between EPA’s claims about the efficacy of trading and
modeling showing much worse results, EPA Administrator
Michael Leavitt told the press that he has ordered his staff to
do more analysis and to consider altering its proposals for
power plants.17 Within days, however, EPA Assistant Administrator Jeffrey Holmstead, the chief architect of the controversial scheme, reassured the utility industry that such reconsideration would be limited to details of the trading system’s design, as opposed to a comprehensive reevaluation
of the soundness of EPA’s overall approach.18 As this Article
goes to press, EPA has neither formally withdrawn the proposal nor halted the period for public comment.
This Article opens with an analysis of EPA’s abortive efforts to minimize benefits of mercury controls, and then undertakes an exploration of its overly generous and exceedingly porous cap-and-trade proposal. This proposal, we
conclude, cannot be fixed with tinkering. EPA should withdraw the proposal and start where it left off a year ago, when
it was still committed to the legally correct and environmentally preferable maximum achievable control technology
(MACT) regime for mercury.
What Does Economics Have to Do With It?
Economics enters into the mercury rulemaking process in
two ways, first via the statute itself and second via an Executive Order.
The statutory opening for economic considerations is
§112(d)(2) of the Clean Air Act (CAA).19 Section 112 requires EPA to set standards for hazardous air pollutants that
are, like mercury, listed in the statute. We explained in the
first part of this series why we think EPA was obligated to
set standards for mercury under §112 of the Act, rather than
under the more lenient §111, as the Agency desires.20 Section 112(d)(2) provides that standards for new sources may
not require less stringent controls than the controls achieved
“in practice by the best controlled similar source,” and that
standards for existing sources may not require less stringent
15. Margaret Kriz, The Next Arsenic: Safeguarding the Food Chain,
Nat’l J., Feb. 14, 2004, at 458. The reference is to a similar controversy early in the Bush Administration when newly minted EPA Administrator Christine Todd Whitman held up rules to reduce arsenic
in drinking water, only to be met with a firestorm of criticism in the
media. Ultimately, she relented, releasing the rule within months of
her initial misstep.
16. Hamburger & Miller, supra note 12; Eric Pianin, Proposed Mercury
Rules Bear Industry Mark, Wash. Post, Jan. 31, 2004, at A4.
17. Hamburger & Miller, supra note 12; see also Jennifer 8. Lee, EPA
May Tighten Its Proposal on Mercury, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 2004, at
A25.
18. Darren Samuelsohn, EPA Will Spotlight Cap-and-Trade Approach
in New Mercury Analysis, Greenwire, Mar. 25, 2004.
19. 42 U.S.C. §7412(d)(2), ELR Stat. CAA §112(d)(2). See also id.
§7412(b)(1) (listing pollutants to be regulated).
20. Heinzerling & Steinzor, supra note 6, at 10305-10.
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controls than those achieved by the best performing 12% of
sources (with certain limited exceptions).21 EPA may, however, require more stringent controls than those achieved by
the best performers. Indeed, EPA is obligated to require
the maximum degree of reduction in emissions of the
hazardous air pollutants subject to this section (including a prohibition on such emissions, where achievable)
that the Administrator, taking into consideration the
cost of achieving such emission reduction, and any
non-air quality health and environmental impacts and
energy requirements, determines is achievable in the
category or subcategory to which such emission standard applies. . . .22

In simple terms, §112(d)(2) requires EPA to consider
more than what sources actually have achieved in practice;
actual achievement marks the lower limit of what EPA must
require of sources under §112. Section 112(d)(2) also requires the Agency to consider what is achievable—to go beyond the achievements already made in practice and to
imagine how much more might be done. In contemplating
the “achievable,” EPA must consider economic costs. Thus
economics enters the §112(d)(2) picture at the moment
when EPA is contemplating doing more (not less) by way of
regulating hazardous air pollutants. As we shall see, however, EPA failed to heed the language of §112(d)(2) insofar
as it failed seriously to consider the economics of more stringent alternatives to its preferred approach.
Economics also enters the regulatory process through Executive Order No. 12866, a President Clinton-era order that
requires agencies to conduct cost-benefit analyses for significant regulatory initiatives.23 In the Bush Administration,
this Executive Order has taken on a whole new, large life.
John Graham, the head of the OMB’s Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), which is responsible for
implementing Executive Order No. 12866, has asserted authority to return proposals to agencies if they do not meet the
test of cost-benefit analysis or are otherwise inconsistent
with the president’s “policies and priorities.”24
OIRA Today
The result of OIRA’s new assertiveness has been significant
intrusion by the office into the rulemaking processes of the
federal agencies.25 Even where statutes do not require or
even allow the cost-benefit analysis contemplated in Executive Order No. 12866 and its accompanying guidance,26
Graham’s OIRA has pushed for intricate cost-benefit analy21. 42 U.S.C. §7412(b)(3).
22. Id. §7412(d)(2).
23. Exec. Order No. 12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (Oct. 4, 1993), Admin.
Mat. 45070.
24. Memorandum for the President’s Management Council from John
D. Graham, Presidential Review of Agency Rulemaking (Sept. 20,
2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/oira_
review-process.html [hereinafter Graham Memo to President’s
Management Council].
25. For an analysis of OIRA’s actions, see U.S. General Accounting
Office, Report to Congressional Requesters, Rulemaking:
OMB’s Role in Reviews of Agencies’ Draft Rules and the
Transparency of Those Reviews (2003) (GAO 03-929).
26. OIRA recently revised its guidance for agencies conducting
cost-benefit analyses. See OMB, OIRA, Circular A-4, Regulatory Analysis (2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
omb/circulars/a004/a-4.pdf.

sis and has delayed and/or undermined agency proposals
that fail to deliver it.
In the fall of 2001, for example, EPA presented to OIRA
for its review a proposal to regulate air pollution from
non-road, spark-ignition (not diesel) engines. EPA offered
the results of a cost-benefit analysis showing a regulator’s
dream come true: the rule would, the Agency had concluded, actually pay for itself, by generally saving consumers in fuel costs more than would be spent retooling engines
to comply with the rule.27 Oh, and the rule would also save
lives, prevent illness, and protect natural resources—but the
Agency had not quantified these benefits; even without
them the rule passed the cost-benefit test with flying colors.28 OIRA’s response? It sent the proposal back to EPA for
more analysis, explaining that it harbored doubts that regulation could provide economic benefits that the market had
not, and seeking precise estimates of the number and monetary value of “all the benefits” of the proposed rule.29 A year
and 687 pages of analysis later, EPA returned to OIRA with
the happy report that yes, the rule would indeed save consumers money—and it would also save many lives, prevent
many illnesses, and protect natural resources.30 Finally,
OIRA let the final rule pass.31
OIRA has also pressed for earlier involvement in the
agencies’ rulemaking deliberations. Executive Order No.
12866 requires cost-benefit analysis to accompany agency
proposals when the proposals are brought before OIRA for
its review.32 In a memorandum to the heads of agencies,
Graham has reinforced this requirement, emphasizing how
important it is that cost-benefit analysis be done early on in
the agency’s decisionmaking process.33
Graham has touted these innovations as means of helping
the Administration achieve “smart regulation,” which he
says is “not uniformly pro-regulation or anti-regulation.
27. See U.S. EPA, Draft Regulatory Support Document: Control of Emissions From Unregulated Non-Road Engines
(2001) (EPA 420-D-01-004).
28. Id. ch. 7 (providing monetary estimates of costs of rule, along with
estimates of tons of pollution avoided).
29. See OMB, OIRA, Letter to the Environmental Protection Agency on
“Control of Emissions From Non-Road Large Spark-Ignition
Engines and Recreational Engines (Marine and Land-Based)” (Sept.
24, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/
spark_engines_epa_sep2001.html.
30. U.S. EPA, Final Regulatory Support Document: Control
of Emissions From Unregulated Non-Road Engines §10
(2002) (EPA 420-R-02-022), available at http://www.epa.gov/otaq/
regs/nonroad/2002/cleanrec-final.htm.
31. U.S. EPA, Control of Emissions From Non-Road Large Spark-Ignition Engines, and Recreational Engines (Marine and Land), Final
Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. 68241 (Nov. 8, 2002).
32. 58 Fed. Reg. at 51741.
33. Graham wrote:
The [regulatory impact analysis (RIA)] must provide an assessment of benefits, costs, and potentially effective and reasonably feasible alternatives to the planned regulatory action
(see [§]6(a)(3)(C)). This is submitted to OIRA along with
the applicable draft regulatory action. Preparing RIAs helps
agencies evaluate the need for and consequences of possible
[f]ederal action. By analyzing alternate ways to structure a
rule, agencies can select the best option while providing
OIRA and the public a broader understanding of the ranges of
issues that may be involved. Accordingly, it is important that
a draft RIA be reviewed by agency economists, engineers,
and scientists, as well as by agency attorneys, prior to submission to OIRA.
Graham Memo to President’s Management Council, supra note 24.
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The science and economics may point in very different directions depending on the case.”34 Smart regulation, Graham has claimed, is about “sound science and economics.”35
The Administration’s rhetoric is, however, very different
from the reality. In truth, cost-benefit analysis in the Bush
Administration has been a one-way street—used to justify
delaying or weakening regulation, not to strengthen it.36
When cost-benefit analysis almost certainly would justify
strengthening regulation, especially environmental regulation, OIRA has kept it holstered in its belt.
The most telling examples of this one-sided approach
have come in the context of air pollution. In the fall of 2003,
OIRA issued a report on the costs and benefits of federal
regulation that was notable for its firm conclusion that air
pollution regulation was one of the biggest—if not the biggest—regulatory bargains around. Between 1992 and 2002,
the CAA’s regulatory programs had, according to OIRA,
produced from $121-193 billion in benefits while imposing
$23-27 billion in costs.37 Nevertheless, the Administration
has insisted on undermining the very kinds of programs that
produce such fantastic results. When it does so, however, it
is careful not to conduct the kind of cost-benefit analysis it
has used to delay or undermine other regulatory efforts—the
kind of cost-benefit analysis that, when it comes to air pollution, almost certainly would show that more regulation is
better. Thus, when the Bush Administration relaxed requirements for power plants and other facilities under the new
source review (NSR) program, it declined to conduct an
economic analysis of the consequences of its actions.38
34. John D. Graham, Stimulating Smarter Regulation: OMB’s Role,
Speech to American Hospital Ass’n (July 17, 2003), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/graham_ama071702.html.
35. Id.
36. Two days before announcing his more interventionist approach to reviewing agency regulations, Graham issued two “prompt” letters,
designed to spur rather than to discourage regulatory actions. One
encouraged the FDA to label trans fatty acids in foods, and the other
encouraged the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) to consider making automated external defibrillators in
workplaces a regulatory priority. OMB, Press Release, OMB Encourages Lifesaving Actions by Regulators (Sept. 18, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/pubpress/2001-35.html.
Although some scholars have made much of these prompt letters
(see, e.g., Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving Federal Regulation? Deeper and Wider CostBenefit Analysis, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1489, 1523-34 (2002)), it is important to keep in mind several things about them: (1) since Graham
issued these two most important prompt letters (on trans fats and
defibrillators), two days before announcing his newly invigorated
approach to reviewing agency actions, no prompt letter suggesting
tightened regulation has been issued; (2) the letter regarding
defibrillators resulted solely in another letter, from OSHA to employers, telling them of the benefits of defibrillators (see, e.g., John
Graham, Speech to Council of Scientific Society Presidents (May
6, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/
scientific_society_speech050602.html); and (3) the rulemaking on
trans fatty acids was begun, not at Graham’s behest, but in 1999, during the Clinton Administration. FDA, Food Labeling: Trans Fatty
Acids in Nutrition Labeling, Nutrient Content Claims, and Health
Claims; Proposed Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. 62746 (Nov. 17, 1999).
37. OIRA, Informing Regulatory Decisions: 2003 Report to
Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal
Entities 7, tbl. 2 (2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
omb/inforeg/regpol-reports_congress.html; see also Eric Pianin,
Study Finds Net Gain From Pollution Rules; OMB Overturns Past
Findings, Wash. Post, Sept. 27, 2003, at A1.
38. U.S. EPA, Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and
Nonattainment New Source Review (NSR): Baseline Emissions Determination, Actual-to-Future-Actual Methodology, Plantwide Ap-

The very same thing is happening with mercury. The full
tale of EPA and OIRA’s hurried and one-sided look at the
economics of regulating mercury speaks volumes about
Graham’s description of cost-benefit analysis as a force for
“sound science and economics” in the regulatory process.
EPA’s About Face
EPA’s announcement in December 2000, that regulation of
mercury from power plants was appropriate and necessary
under §112 of the CAA set in motion a chain of events familiar to any student of the regulatory process. EPA’s career
employees went to work trying to identify pollution controls
that would satisfy §112’s requirements. EPA formed a
stakeholder panel that met for 21 months to consider the issues involved in establishing the MACT standard that everyone assumed EPA would promulgate.39 By the spring of
2003, the working group had agreed upon a set of model
runs they wanted EPA to do in order to help decide what controls to require. Experts outside of EPA, not associated with
the working group, also had weighed in with promising descriptions of the raft of control technologies that would be
available once the regulatory framework had gelled.40
Meanwhile, on a parallel track, the Administration had
announced that as part of its signature “Clear Skies” proposal it wanted the U.S. Congress to consider repealing the
mandate that EPA establish technology-based requirements
for power plant emissions and instead adopt a trading approach. This venture into the troubled waters of applying
trading to a highly toxic substance had prompted extensive
criticism from the environmental community and its allies
in Congress, although most of those involved with the Clear
Skies legislative debate were preoccupied with other issues,
including the legislation’s omission of carbon dioxide (CO2)
and whether the caps it set on the pollutants it did cover were
sufficiently stringent.41
Despite their obvious recognition that the Administration
was testing the political waters on mercury trading, none of
the key stakeholders thought that EPA would do anything
other than promulgate a MACT standard for mercury in the
absence of final passage of such legislation, a prospect that
appeared remote then and even more remote now. These
perceptions were described in U.S. Senate testimony on the
Clear Skies legislation delivered on April 8, 2003, by David
plicability Limitations, Clean Units, Pollution Control Projects; Final Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. 80186, 80241 (Dec. 31, 2002) (stating only
that proposal had been submitted to the OMB for review); U.S.
EPA, Technical Support Document for the Prevention of
Significant Deterioration and Nonattainment Area New
Source Review Regulations II-7-1 to II-7-2 (2002), available at
http://www.epa.gov/ttn/nsr/rule_dev.html (stating that no RIA was
required for the rule because OMB “has determined that the final
rule is significant for novel policy reasons but not for economic reasons,” and declining to require RIA in response to commenter’s
claim that the NSR program in its unrevised form produced benefits
7-10 times greater than costs).
39. Proposed Power Plant Rule, supra note 1, at 4656.
40. Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management
(NESCAUM), Environmental Regulation and Technology
Innovation: Controlling Mercury Emissions From CoalFired Boilers (2000) [hereinafter NESCAUM 2000 Report].
41. Testimony of David G. Hawkins, Hearings on S. 485, Clear Skies Act
of 2003, U.S. Senate Comm. on Env’t and Public Works, Subcomm.
on Clean Air, Climate Change, and Nuclear Safety (Apr. 8, 2003),
available at http://epw.senate.gov/108th/Hawkins_040803.htm
[hereinafter Hawkins Testimony].
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Hawkins of the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
(NRDC), who was a member of EPA’s working group for
the mercury rule:
In the regulatory development process now underway,
EPA is evaluating performance requirements that would
achieve a reduction to 5 tons per year. The weakest option being analyzed by the agency (at the request of the
utility industry) is a level only slightly higher than the administration plan’s second-phase target of 15 tons.
No one, including the administration, has contended
that a standard as weak as the administration plan’s
first-phase target—26 tons—could pass muster under
the MACT requirement of current law. Even a MACT
standard that reduced emissions by only 70[%] would
cut mercury pollution to 15 tons 10 years earlier than the
administration legislation.
The administration plan, however, would repeal the
MACT requirement and delay any initial mercury reductions to 2010. After that, the administration plan would
allow 26 tons per year from 2010 through 2017, and 15
tons every year thereafter. Compared to the 5-ton level,
the administration plan would allow more than five
times as much mercury pollution through 2017, and
three times as much each year after. From 2008 through
2020, that would be 284 tons more cumulative loading
of mercury under the administration plan.42

Clearly, no one had yet informed the working group
that EPA’s approach to mercury regulation was about to
change dramatically.
Around the same time that Hawkins delivered his testimony, EPA cancelled the working group’s next meeting,
and never reconvened the group.43 William Wehrum, counsel to Holmstead, told EPA career staff attending a meeting
on the mercury rule not to do the model runs the working
group had requested.44 Although he was present at the same
meeting, Holmstead reportedly did not respond to staffers’
objections to cancelling the analysis.45 Later, Holmstead
stated that the analysis was cancelled partly due to “White
House concerns.”46
From this point forward, it appears, there was no longer
any serious discussion of requiring mercury reductions that
would be consistent with the reduction rates—some on the
order of 90%47—that EPA had identified early on in its deliberations regarding mercury.48 Instead, EPA chose not
only to move to a trading approach, but also initially to require only those reductions that would already be initiated

42. Id.
43. Hamburger & Miller, supra note 12; see also Letter from John A.
Paul, Co-chair of Utility MACT Working Group, to Jeffrey
Holmstead (Nov. 3, 2003), on file with the authors (letter states that
the scheduled April 15, 2003, meeting of the working group was cancelled on April 1, and no further communications with the working
group occurred after that date, and disputes newspaper quote by
Wehrum stating that the working group had completed its work before April 2003).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Hawkins Testimony, supra note 41 (citing U.S. EPA, Discussion of
Multipollutant Strategy, Meeting With Edison Electric Institute
(Sept. 18, 2001), available at http://cta.policy.net/currentstatus.pdf
[hereinafter EEI Meeting]).
48. Hamburger & Miller, supra note 12.

as a result of the Interstate Air Quality Rule (IAQR) being
developed by EPA at the same time.49
EPA decided, in other words, that its preference was for
power plants to have to do nothing extra (until 2018 at the
earliest) beyond reductions otherwise required by controls
on SO2 and NOx.
EPA’s economic analysis of the power plant rule discusses two scenarios: the single MACT alternative that EPA
ultimately selected and its trading proposal. Regarding
EPA’s (least favored) proposal to impose MACT under
§112, EPA’s failure to consider alternatives in detail is legally problematic because, as noted, §112 requires EPA to
analyze not only what is achieved in practice, but also what
is achievable, in setting §112 standards. Even its analysis of
what is achieved in practice falls very short. EPA declined to
require the controls achieved in practice because EPA
thought there was too much variability in these controls to
justify mandating them. Thus, the Agency adjusted the level
of control achieved in practice to account for this variability.50 Incredibly, in doing so, EPA simply lifted whole passages from the publication of an industry trade group, Western Energy Supply and Transmission (WEST) Associates.51
EPA’s failure seriously to consider alternatives to its preferred proposal also should have gotten it into trouble under
Executive Order No. 12866. As noted, OIRA has not been
shy about requiring more analysis from EPA under this order. Yet OIRA did not require EPA to look at more alternatives, nor did it even require EPA to prepare a formal regulatory impact analysis (RIA) of the kind usually required for
such a major rule. EPA, in fact, appears to have continued to
work on the economic analysis for the mercury rule for
weeks after issuing the actual regulatory proposal on December 15, 2003.52
We will shortly discuss the role OIRA did play in EPA’s
proposal. For now, we note that OIRA did see fit to make
sure the docket included a memorandum stating that at least
one other major proposed rule in recent history had not been
accompanied by an RIA.53
With OIRA apparently asleep at the cost-benefit switch,
one might expect that the economic analysis EPA did eventually produce would show that EPA’s proposal failed the
cost-benefit test. But here, too, plot twists await.
49. Proposed Power Plant Rule, supra note 1, at 4698.
50. Id. at 4670-75.
51. Hamburger & Miller, supra note 12. Compare Proposed Power Plant
Rule, supra note 1, at 4670-75, with WEST Associates, Multivariable Method to Estimate the Mercury Emissions of the
Best-Performing Coal-Fired Utility Units Under the Most
Adverse Circumstances Which Can Reasonably Be Expected to Recur (ENSR Corp. 2003), available at http://www.epa.
gov/ttn/atw/combust/utiltox/final_ensr_multivar.pdf.
52. EPA’s benefits analysis was not publicly available until early February 2004. Perusal of the items in EPA’s docket for the mercury rule
reveals much analytical work continued on EPA’s proposal following its announcement of the proposal on December 15, 2003. The
rulemaking docket is available on the Internet at http://cascade.epa.
gov/RightSite/dk_public_collection_detail.htm?ObjectType=dk_
docket_collection&cid=OAR-2002-0056&ShowList=items&
Action=view (U.S. EPA docket document no. OAR-2002-00560068) [hereinafter Docket].
53. E-mail from Ron Evans, U.S. EPA, to Arthur G. Fraas, OIRA (Jan.
28, 2004), available at Docket, supra note 52 (Evans to Fraas: “You
asked me if I could think of a rule where we had not done a formal
RIA. The answer is yes. The NOx SIP Call proposal was published
without a[n] RIA. The benefits analysis did not come until later.”).
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The Punchline: $13 Billion in Net Benefits
About a month and a half after issuing its mercury proposal,
EPA finally coughed up an economic analysis of the rule.
The analysis exists in bits and pieces throughout the docket.
EPA’s analysis drew together remnants from various documents, including the Agency’s analysis of President George
W. Bush’s Clear Skies legislative initiative, its analysis of
the simultaneously developed IAQR, and some analysis
performed specifically regarding the mercury rule itself.
Perhaps the most striking document in this pile is EPA’s
“Benefits Analysis for the Section 112 Utility Rule.”54 Two
amazing facts are clear from this document.
First, in analyzing the mercury rule, EPA did not quantify
or monetize—nor, it appears, did it even attempt to quantify
or monetize—the benefits of reducing mercury itself.55 After a lengthy discussion of the risks posed by mercury and
the attendant gains from reducing it, EPA simply states that
it is unable to quantify or monetize these risks and gains.
What is more, EPA did not quantify or monetize many other,
nonmercury-related benefits of reducing mercury. EPA expects that other harmful, even deadly, air pollutants will be
reduced when mercury is controlled—pollutants such as
NOx (which contributes to ozone formation), SO2, and particulate matter (PM). In estimating the benefits of the mercury rule, EPA pulled out only one variety of these other pollutants—the PM formed when NOx and SO2 are emitted into
the atmosphere—and took that as the sole basis for its estimates of the benefits of the mercury rule. Even for that category of pollutant, EPA analyzed only some of the benefits of
reducing it.56
Thus, in estimating the benefits of the mercury rule, EPA
analyzed only a tiny subset of the universe of beneficial consequences of the rule—excluding even the benefits of reducing mercury itself. Again, therefore, one might expect
that EPA’s analysis would show a striking disparity between
costs and benefits, given EPA’s limited analysis of the benefits of the rule.
Here, one would be correct, but in the wrong direction.
This is the second amazing fact about EPA’s benefits analysis: EPA’s analysis does indeed show a striking disparity between the costs and benefits of the mercury MACT
rule—but the benefits outweigh the costs, and by $13 billion at that.57 For EPA’s trading proposal, the net benefits
are even higher.58 Even with EPA’s stingy calculation of
benefits, the rule produces a fantastically positive cost-benefit ratio.
OIRA’s Troubling Role
As with the cost-saving non-road engine rule, one would
have expected the efficiency hawks at OIRA to love the
mercury rule. But as with the non-road rule, they did not. To
be sure, OIRA did not, as it had with the non-road rule, return the power plant proposal to EPA for further work. Here,
however, one wonders why not: if one could achieve $13
54. U.S. EPA, Benefits Analysis for the Section 112 Utility Rule (Jan.
2004) (EPA 452-R-03-021), available at Docket, supra note 52, document no. 105.
55. Id. at 1-3.
56. Id. at 2-22 to 2-23.
57. Id. at 2-49.
58. Id.

billion in net benefits with a weak mercury rule, without
counting the mercury-related benefits and many other good
consequences of the rule, one would suppose that OIRA’s
economists would have asked EPA to consider whether a
stricter rule could have achieved even larger net benefits.
In the hundreds of pages available in the public record
documenting the correspondence between EPA and
OIRA on this rule, however, not a single question is raised
by OIRA economists about whether stricter regulation
would be justified by taking a more careful look at costs
and benefits.
In fact, one of the few amplifications to the economic
analysis that was produced by the many exchanges between
EPA and OIRA was a paragraph that seems intended to
dampen the reader’s enthusiasm for mercury regulation
upon seeing the large net benefits it provides. In a paragraph following EPA’s report of the $13 billion in net benefits from the rule, a draft of the Preamble (as of December
12, 2003) stated:
The estimate of $15 billion in benefits for mercury control, compared to less than $2 billion in costs, appears
impressive at first glance. However, the large benefit estimate is not attributable to reducing human and environmental exposure to mercury. It arises from ancillary reductions in [SO2] and [NOx] that result from controls
aimed at complying with mercury requirements. Although consideration of ancillary benefits is reasonable,
it is unlikely that these benefits are uniquely attributable
to mercury regulation. In the years ahead, as the Agency
and the states develop rules, guidance and policies to implement the new air-quality standards for ozone and
[PM], coal-fired power plants will be forced and encouraged to implement controls to reduce [SO2] and [NOx]
(e.g., year-round NOx controls, SCR [selective catalytic
reduction] units, scrubbers, conversion to low-sulphur
coals, and so forth). Thus, the ancillary benefits of mercury control will be achieved anyway, regardless of
whether a mercury rule is promulgated . . . . In light of
these considerations, the Agency believes that the key
rationale for controlling mercury is to reduce public and
environmental exposure to mercury, thereby reducing
risk to public health and wildlife. Although the available
science does not support quantification of these benefits
at this time, the Agency believes the qualitative benefits
are compelling enough to justify substantial investment
in mercury emission reductions.59

This paragraph appears to have been added by Wehrum,
counsel to Holmstead, and passed the inspection of Arthur
Fraas at OIRA.60 The paragraph shows that EPA and OIRA,
far from trying to find more bargains in this basement, tried
to make the bargain they had already found look as minimal
as possible.
Instead of asking tough questions about EPA’s failure to
consider alternatives, or insisting on more complete analysis of the benefits of mercury regulation, OIRA economists limited themselves largely to flyspecking EPA’s
discussion of the risks of mercury. From the documents
available in the public record, it appears, for example, that
59. Fax dated December 12, 2003, available at id., document no. 107, at
491. A slightly modified version of this paragraph appears in EPA’s
final benefits analysis, id., document no. 105, at 2-48 to 2-49.
60. A fax dated December 14, 2003, from Fraas instructs that then-current draft “Insert & from Bill W.” (the paragraph in question is the
one quoted in text). The fax is available at id., document no. 107, at
630, 656.
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OIRA economist Fraas made certain that all references to
the health risks of mercury omitted the adjective “confirmed,” which had preceded such references in preliminary
drafts of EPA’s proposal.61
OIRA also softened EPA’s language regarding a link between mercury and cardiovascular effects. OIRA suggested
inserting the word “possible” before a reference to cardiovascular effects in a diagram in EPA’s benefits analysis,62
and also recommended greatly softening EPA’s language
describing studies finding a link between mercury and cardiovascular effects.63 Yet even the study OIRA cited in making these changes itself recognizes that in the general population (rather than in the population of dentists mostly involved in the study), a weak link between mercury exposure
and the risk of coronary heart disease could not be ruled
out.64 Other studies have come to much more assertive conclusions about this link.65 The issue highlighted (and the
risk soft-pedaled) by OIRA is significant for any assessment of the full threats posed by mercury, as any change in
the overall risk of adverse cardiovascular effects would implicate many thousands of people and their health, given
the high rate of cardiovascular disease in our population.
When EPA studied the costs and benefits of phasing down
lead in gasoline in the 1980s, for example, benefits estimates that credited studies showing a link between lead and
blood pressure put the benefits of the phase down through
the roof.66
Sometimes the unfortunate consequences of having
OIRA (with its predominant expertise in economics) overseeing the statements of EPA (with its superior scientific expertise) are painfully clear. In the discussion of the health effects of mercury, for example, OIRA inserted several sentences casting some doubt on EPA’s ability, through the
power plant rule, to make a difference in the blood mercury
levels in women. Women in the study showing high mercury
levels, OIRA added, reportedly ate mostly tuna and shrimp,
and thus OIRA inserted language suggesting that the link
between mercury regulation and women’s mercury levels
was unclear.67 Yet at the very same time, EPA and the FDA
were preparing a fish advisory on mercury—released in
March—that stated that shrimp and canned light tuna
were among the seafoods low in mercury that women
could safely eat! 68 It is hard to escape the conclusion that
OIRA, no matter how misguidedly, was grasping at any
straw that might undermine the case for swift and stringent regulation of mercury.
Other examples of OIRA’s efforts to have EPA downplay
mercury’s risks abound. We do not catalogue all of them
here, though we do encourage our readers to peruse docu61. See id. at 81 (handwritten note apparently documenting comments
from “Art”; the only “Art” involved in the EPA/OIRA exchanges
is Fraas).
62. See id. at 329.
63. See id. at 43.
64. Yoshizawa et al., Mercury and the Risk of Coronary Heart Disease in
Men, 347 New Eng. J. Med. 1755, 1760 (2002).
65. See, e.g., Guallar et al., Mercury, Fish Oils, and the Risk of Myocardial Infarction, 347 New Eng. J. Med. 1747 (2002).
66. Albert L. Nichols, Lead in Gasoline, in Economic Analyses at
EPA: Assessing Regulatory Impact 73-76 (Richard D. Morgenstern ed., 1997).
67. See Docket, supra note 52, document no. 107, at 555.
68. See Joint Federal Advisory for Mercury in Fish, supra note 9.

ments numbered 107 and 108 in EPA’s docket for this rule,
which contain voluminous fax and e-mail correspondence
between OIRA and EPA concerning the rule and which
make (for the regulatory buff) highly interesting reading.
For present purposes, suffice it to say that OIRA’s role in
this particular rulemaking had essentially nothing to do with
promoting economic efficiency, but everything to do with
softening the case for regulation.
Lost Opportunities
In offering a policy that would not require power plants to
do anything more (until at least 2018) to control mercury
than they are already being required to do under other legal
provisions, EPA is missing a large opportunity to force
promising mercury control technologies into commercial
viability. As noted at the outset of this Article, §112 is deliberately technology-forcing, requiring EPA seriously to consider setting standards for hazardous air pollutants reflecting achievable rather than merely already achieved levels
of control.
As industry geared up for what everyone expected would
be a stringent MACT rule for mercury, one could see the
proliferation and improvement of control technologies that
accompanies regulatory progress. Moreover, because §112
allows EPA to set performance standards rather than design standards (thus permitting firms to meet the MACT
standard in whatever way works best for them), firms producing pollution control technologies had a large incentive
to begin to convince energy firms that their technologies
for controlling mercury were better than their competitors’ technologies.
The kind of regulatory flexibility provided by performance standards has served us exceedingly well in the past.
For example, although the trading aspects of the CAA’s acid
rain program have been much discussed, less well known is
the fact that in the early years of the program very little trading actually occurred—and yet, nevertheless, new mechanisms for controlling SO2 grew and flourished. The performance-based standards set by the acid rain trading program
were sufficient, even without significant trading, to encourage competition in pollution control.
One would have expected the same kind of competition to
occur if EPA issued a performance-based mercury MACT
rule. Indeed, air pollution experts predicted precisely this
result, describing the many control technologies waiting in
the wings for EPA’s rule.69 The image is of being on the
verge of technological breakthroughs just waiting for regulation to nudge them into reality. What is the message
EPA’s mercury proposal sends to the companies that have
been developing control technologies? Don’t waste your
time and money.
Although EPA justifies its preference for trading by
pointing to the incentives for innovation it believes trading
will create, in fact the trading regime proposed by EPA is so
weak, and so full of loopholes, that the only incentives it will
create will be those favoring delay and business as usual. We
turn next to a more detailed examination of EPA’s proposal
for allowing commercial trading in mercury.

69. NESCAUM 2000 Report, supra note 40.
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Toil, Much Trouble for EPA’s Bubbles
Conservative regulatory reformers have touted the benefits
of emissions trading as an alternative to traditional regulation for two decades. But Congress has only authorized the
approach once—in the acid rain title to the 1990 CAA
Amendments.70 That trading system, and another sponsored by the South Coast Air Quality Management District
(SCAQMD) in the Los Angeles airshed,71 remain the only
fully-developed trading systems in the United States.72 The
two are diametrically opposed in outcome: acid rain is
widely regarded as a success, while the SCAQMD experiment is universally acknowledged to have been a disaster.
Nevertheless, the sheer persistence of trading advocates has
elevated this alternative to the crown jewel of market-based
mechanisms, and it is hailed as the key to an overhaul of environmental regulation in the 21st century.
Like most other participants in the trading debate, we do
not oppose trading across-the-board. In fact, we support it in
carefully selected circumstances—where the targeted pollution is not toxic, such as in the context of nutrient contamination of surface water or global CO2 emissions in air—and
with carefully constructed design features, such as appropriately rigorous and steadily declining caps. In those circumstances, trading may well prove the silver bullet that overcomes political resistance to desperately needed pollution
reductions.73 Whenever we return to an era where environmental issues are not so polarized, we hope and expect we
could find promising common ground with conservatives to
expand trading in a variety of contexts.
Consequently, it is no small irony that one of the notable
travesties of the Bush Administration’s mercury policy is
that it cannot but undermine the search for agreement on extending trading. The use of this relatively new regulatory
remedy to address one of the world’s most toxic pollutants,
and the intrinsic design weaknesses of the system EPA put
forward in December 2003, are so far outside the mainstream of the debate that they confound rather than assist
such developments. Rather than build support for trading
through the execution of carefully considered, statutorily
authorized programs that have a reasonable chance of working, the Bush Administration has likely ensured that trading
is, at least in the short run, perceived by the media and the
public as a vehicle for delivering toxic windfalls to powerful
70. 42 U.S.C. §7651.
71. For a description and analysis of these programs, see Richard
Toshiyuki Drury et al., Pollution Trading and Environmental Injustice: Los Angeles’ Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy, 9 Duke
Envtl. L. & Pol’y F. 231 (1999); Rena I. Steinzor, Toward Better
Bubbles and Future Lives: A Progressive Response to the Conservative Agenda for Reforming Environmental Law, 32 ELR 11421 (Dec.
2002).
72. Two other major trading program were launched by northeastern
states in 1999 (ozone) and 2003 (NOx), but it is too early to evaluate
the performance of those programs which, in any event, do not involve toxic emissions. Proposed Power Plant Rule, supra note 1, at
4702.
73. We note in this regard that the most credible voices in the national environmental community have also supported trading in such contexts, despite periodic allegations we have heard from conservatives
that everyone who does not endorse it immediately, in every context,
is a reactionary wedded to discredited command-and-control strategies. See, e.g., Hawkins Testimony, supra note 41 (supporting trading but disagreeing with the design of the Bush Administration’s
Clear Skies proposal).

industries that have won White House favor through major
campaign contributions.74
Do we exaggerate? The Administration claims that the
cap-and-trade plan it advocates will reduce mercury emissions by 70%—to 15 tons per year (TPY)—in 2018.
Leaving aside for the moment whether these numbers in and
of themselves are acceptable, the plan is designed to allow
sources to “bank” mercury credits indefinitely. It affords industry a “safety valve” that allows the purchase of credits at
$2,187 per ounce from future allocations, also indefinitely.
EPA’s own models show that these features could mean that
utilities achieve no more than 52% reductions, to approximately 24 TPY, as late as 2026.75
Confronted by such calculations, Administrator Leavitt is
back-peddling rapidly. As we mentioned earlier, he told the
Los Angeles Times on March 16, 2004, that although EPA
has expressed a “clear preference” for trading, it will also
look at more “traditional,” technology-based, regulatory approaches.76 Leavitt claimed he was under “no pressure to do
anything other than the right thing from the White House.”77
We leave to others the daily monitoring of the blood pressure of key EPA and White House officials as their proposals for mercury controls on power plants continue to come
under attack not just by environmentalists, but by a broad
range of state officials.78 Rather, the analysis that follows
delves into the details of President Bush’s trading plan in order to establish some benchmarks for evaluating what will
inevitably be a moving target as the Administration and its
industry allies attempt to address the most egregious aspects
of the trading scheme.
Before stepping into that morass, we reiterate a threshold
point that can get lost too easily in this debate: it is absolutely inappropriate from a public health and ecological perspective, much less from a legal or economic viewpoint, to
experiment with trading toxics at this stage in the development of emissions trading as an alternative tool for pollution
reduction. No amount of tweaking, readjusting, moderating,
or tightening can save this proposal from that perspective.
Trading should be abandoned in the context of mercury
forthwith—not only for the legal reasons we discussed in
the first part in this series, but for reasons of public health
and justice as well.
74. A recent article in the Los Angeles Times noted that “coal and electricity companies and executives have donated $40 million to Republican candidates and committees, including $1.3 million directly
to Bush campaigns, according to figures compiled by the Center for
Responsive Politics.” Hamburger & Miller, supra note 12.
75. The initial document exposing these problems was a letter written by
Eric Schaeffer, former EPA enforcement official and now director of
the Environmental Integrity Project, to EPA Administrator Leavitt.
The letter asked Leavitt to “clarify the record” on these issues. Letter
from Eric V. Schaeffer, to the Hon. Michael O. Leavitt, Administrator, U.S. EPA (Jan. 21, 2004), available at http://www.environmental
integrity.org/pubs/leavitt_mercury_letter.pdf. Schaeffer wrote a
second letter to Leavitt reiterating this request on February 18, 2004.
Letter from Eric V. Schaeffer, to the Hon. Michael O. Leavitt,
Administrator, U.S. EPA (Feb. 18, 2004), available at http://www.
environmentalintegrity.org/pubs/Letter_-_Leavitt_mercury_-_218-04.pdf [hereinafter collectively Schaeffer Letters].
76. Hamburger & Miller, supra note 12.
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., Testimony of Cory Chadwick on behalf of the State and
Territorial Air Pollution Program Administrators and the Ass’n of
Local Air Pollution Control Officials on U.S. EPA’s Proposed Rule
to Control Emissions of Hazardous Air Pollutants From Utilities
(Feb. 25, 2004), available at http://www.4cleanair.org/mercuryand
transporttestimony-Chadwick.pdf.
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The overarching reason why it is unacceptable to trade
toxics is the probability that trades will result in localized
“hot spots” of pollution, posing extreme threats to specific
people and ecosystems. Precisely because trading leaves it
up to the marketplace to determine which power plant emits
more and which less, it is impossible to predict, much less
control after-the-fact such concentrations. In the case of
acute toxics like mercury, which are also very persistent,
the potential for such localized—and irreversible—catastrophes is intolerable from any objective perspective.
There are preliminary indications that those effects may
burden communities of color more than white communities.
The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) reported in 2001,
that approximately 10% of women of child-bearing age
have mercury levels within one-tenth of the reference dose
that is associated with an increase in abnormal scores on
cognitive function tests among children.79 In 2003, a second
CDC report reported that non-Hispanic white children ages
1-5 years old had lower blood mercury levels than either
non-Hispanic blacks or Mexican Americans and that mercury levels in non-Hispanic black women between the ages
of 16-49 were higher than levels in non-Hispanic whites and
Mexican Americans.80 EPA should make it a priority to pursue the implications of these preliminary findings, exploring the link between mercury exposure, race, and class. But
toxic hot spots are unjust regardless.
Indeed, we are tempted to say that it will never be appropriate to trade toxics, although we demur because our academic discipline makes this unqualified word stick in our
throats. Some day in the indefinite future, it may be possible
to monitor each source so carefully, and predict the fate and
transport of toxic pollution so precisely, that a system could
be designed that would allow trading of toxics, with a hair
trigger poised to cut off the trades at any instant that the
toxics were accumulating in a local area. But that day is
not today, and will not come for the foreseeable future. Of
course, it is also true that such a system would be so uncertain from the perspective of regulated industry that it is hard
to see why it would be preferable to a straightforward requirement that mercury emissions be controlled through the
installation of control technologies, as Congress mandated
back in 1990.
Again, as we explained earlier, trading, especially trading
without congressional authorization, has been on the table in
this context for a relatively short period. We suspect, in fact,
that the Administration’s decision to embrace trading in the
administrative context came as almost as much of a surprise
to the electric utility industry as it did to the environmental
community and state officials. As a result, everything written about trading thus far, especially in the administrative
context, has a quality of spontaneous improvisation. The
danger is that as people become more and more engaged in
refining the details of the trading proposal, they will lose
sight of the overriding fact that trading is an inappropriate
remedy that should not be pursued in any circumstance.
It is an age-old strategy for lawyers and legislators (often
one-in-the-same) to put a large number of requests on the
79. CDC, First National Report on Human Exposure to Environmental Chemicals 18 (2001), available at http://www.cdc.
gov/nceh/dls/ner.htm.
80. CDC, Second National Report on Human Exposure to Environmental Chemicals 19 (2003), available at http://www.cdc.
gov/nceh/dls/ner.htm.

bargaining table in the hopes that the negotiated settlement
has a large footprint in relationship to what the client wanted
in the first place. The trading proposal has at least three such
attributes for electric utilities. First, it distracts attention
from the weakness of the MACT proposal that accompanied
it, making that proposal look far more attractive that it deserves to look in comparison. Second, it provides ample opportunity to negotiate the details of the trading system by,
for example, hardening and reducing the cap, limiting banking, or eliminating the safety valve, making participants feel
as if they have achieved benefits for the environment and
public health even though the entire arena of trading is illegal and inappropriate. Third, it guarantees delay, probably
for many years, in any regulatory requirements.
The environmental effects of these delays will be compounded by what one major newspaper has called the “new
coal rush.”81 About one month after EPA published its trading proposal, the Christian Science Monitor reported that
“after 25 years on the blacklist of America’s energy sources,
coal is poised to make a comeback . . . . [A]t least 94 coalfired electric power plants—with the capacity to power 62
million American homes—are now planned across 36
states.”82 Scheduled to start coming on-line as early as next
year, the plants will expand the country’s generating power
substantially, help keep electricity prices low, and offer alternatives to foreign oil and gas, according to the article.
“But they would also pump more airborne mercury and
greenhouse gases such as [CO2, NOx, and SO2] into the
air . . . . [A]pparently economic concerns are trumping environmental ones in utilities’ plans.”83
Although it never acknowledges explicitly that it is aware
of these trends, EPA mentions variations in coal use as a reason why mandating MACT will not work well to reduce
mercury emissions and a “specific limit or cap” is far preferable: “[W]ith shifts in coal use and with growth in the economy, Hg [mercury] emissions would likely substantially exceed the overall emission level achieved when the MACT
limits are initially met.”84 Given the porous and excessively
generous nature of the two-stage cap EPA has proposed, this
disingenuous statement would be laughable if the subject
was not so serious.
Our analysis of the trading scheme per se begins with an
assessment of the rigor of its overall goals, proceeds to an
analysis of how the porosity of a 2018 cap will lead to even
longer delays in emissions reductions, and considers its implications for the formation of hot spots.
An Excessively Generous Cap
The caps contained in the proposal will be implemented in
two phases, the first to begin in 2010 and the second in
2018.85 The amount of the 2010 limit has not yet been set because EPA says that it wants to set the number at the same
level—and certainly no higher than—mercury reductions
that will be achieved as a “co-benefit” of its IAQR, but says
81. Mark Clayton, America’s New Coal Rush, Christian Sci. Monitor, Feb. 26. 2004, §4, at 1, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/
2004/0226/p01s04-sten.html.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Proposed Power Plant Rule, supra note 1, at 4687-88.
85. Id. at 4697-99.
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it is unsure what that number might be.86 It has invited the
stakeholders to help it resolve this dilemma.
The Agency’s reticence is no doubt due to the pounding it
has taken in recent months from the electric utility industry
and its allies on Capitol Hill. The Agency’s initial Clear
Skies proposal would have established a 26 TPY cap in
2010.87 After the industry eviscerated the modeling that
supported this figure, Sen. James Inhofe (R-Okla.), chair of
the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, proposed revisions to the Bush Clear Skies legislation lifting
this interim target by 31%, to about 34 TPY.88
The Agency’s confusion about what amount of mercury
reductions will result from those technology-based controls
stands in stark contrast to its self-confident assertions that
trading will not result in hot spots because it can trace the
“bad” and “good” kinds of mercury deposition with great
precision. We will consider that opportunistic paradox more
in a moment.
In any event, whatever the 2010 number turns out to be,
the Agency sets the second-phase cap, to go into effect in
2018, at 15 TPY, or a 70% reduction from emission levels
today. This level would be “permanent” and could not be exceeded, “regardless of future growth in the energy sector.”89
However, as discussed in detail below, it is far from clear
when the industry would actually cross the finish line and
achieve 70% reductions, because the proposal would allow
indefinite delays in meeting these limits.
In absolute terms, the 34 TPY (give or take) in 2010 and
15 TPY in 2018 are far less ambitious than the leading legislative alternative or, as significant, what EPA said up until
recently it could accomplish through the legally mandated
MACT approach. The Clean Power Act, introduced as S.
556 in the 107th Congress, would reduce mercury emissions
to five TPY in 2007 using a MACT approach.90 This number
is comparable to MACT proposals under consideration
when the Bush Administration abruptly halted the exploration of such alternatives. At a meeting held on September
18, 2001, EPA career staff told Edison Electric Institute representatives to expect the mercury MACT to be the equivalent of the 90% reductions required of municipal and medical waste incinerators, or somewhere in the vicinity of five
TPY no later than 2007.91
Even the weakest MACT option considered by the
Agency during that period was a level roughly equivalent to
the trading proposals second-phase target of 15 TPY, but
that MACT target would be reached by 2008, a full decade
sooner than ostensibly required by the trading proposal, and
two decades sooner than EPA modeling shows these reductions would actually be achieved.92 Most recently, as we
mentioned earlier, an analysis of mercury-control technology trials by EPA’s ORD found that with the addition of fabric filters, activated carbon injection has the potential to
achieve 90% reduction by 2010.93

Of course, once the Administration decided to abandon
MACT and pursue trading, it must have seemed prudent to
stack the deck against MACT even further by weakening
those requirements to the point that they would achieve significantly less reductions than the new trading proposal.94
Given that (weakened) baseline, EPA announced cheerfully,
trading is likely to produce better results for the environment than MACT because banking will give utilities an incentive to make reductions earlier.95
All of these pronouncements seem designed to stir up a
great cloud of dust in the wake of the Agency’s startling departure from more rigorous, technology-forcing controls.
For awhile, this sleight-of-hand shell game worked, confusing the press, which initially reported that the Administration was proposing for the first time to control mercury
emissions without ever mentioning that it had rejected significantly more stringent alternatives.96 The confusion was
exacerbated by EPA’s delay in publishing a supplemental
notice refining its trading proposal until March 16, 2004, a
full three months after its initial announcement describing
the framework of its proposal.97 But within weeks, as people
picked through the reams of paper churned out by the
Agency, the characteristics of not only a generous, but an
exceedingly porous, cap were at last understood.
An Excessively Porous Cap
Rather than EPA’s optimistic prediction that trading will
help reduce pollution to acceptable limits on a permanent
basis, the opposite outcome is far more likely to occur: existing plants will also receive allocations giving them allowances to emit mercury at levels that do not require the
installation of mercury-specific control technologies until
2018.98 Even then, utilities can escape the strictures of the
cap by banking portions of their overly generous allocations
in the early years.99 Under this anticipated gaming of the
system, meaningful reductions could be delayed for at least
two decades.
However, the Agency hastens to assure the energy industry, because better technologies will become available by
that point and the cap will “create an incentive for certain
plants to install these newer technologies,” the cap “should
not have any significant impact on power availability, reliability, or pricing . . . . Nor should a 15-ton cap cause any significant shift in fuels currently utilized by power plants.”100
These assurances are far more credible than EPA’s promises that the caps will produce better environmental benefits
than a MACT approach because two other features of its
trading proposal mean that power plants will have significantly more time—under EPA’s own modeling, until
2026—to actually bite the bullet and install pollution con94. Proposed Power Plant Rule, supra note 1, at 4706.
95. Id.

86. Id. at 4698.
87. Id.
88. Steve Cook, “Clear Skies” Rewrite by Inhofe Includes 31 Percent
Higher Mercury Emissions Cap, Env’t Rep. (BNA), Nov. 14, 2003,
at 2477.
89. Proposed Power Plant Rule, supra note 1, at 4698.
90. Hawkins Testimony, supra note 41.
91. EEI Meeting, supra note 47.
92. Hawkins Testimony, supra note 41.
93. Developing Technology, supra note 14.

96. Jennifer 8. Lee, EPA Plans to Expand Pollution Markets, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 15, 2003, at 24.
97. Proposed Power Plant Rule Supplemental Notice, supra note 1, at
12398.
98. The first phase cap is designed to mirror reductions achieved
through other rules. Proposed Power Plant Rule, supra note 1, at
4687.
99. Proposed Power Plant Rule Supplemental Notice, supra note 1, at
12411.
100. Proposed Power Plant Rule, supra note 1, at 4699.
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trols.101 First, the proposal establishes a “safety valve” capping allowance costs at $2,187.50 per ounce, a price that
will be annually adjusted for inflation.102 If free market trading results in allowance prices above that level, EPA will allow utilities to buy them from the “bank” of future allowances at the safety valve price, in effect giving utilities a perpetual credit card against which to charge today’s consumption against tomorrow’s wages.103
Second, the proposal anticipates banking “without restriction” as an incentive for early reductions.104 In a situation where a cap is set sufficiently low to generate a strong
need for allowances almost immediately, banking does
serve as an incentive for early reductions because utilities
have some confidence that there will be a lucrative market
for the allowances they manage to “put away” in the bank.
But in a situation where a cap is set high and is porous, the
market for future allowances becomes highly speculative,
and banking can have the opposite effect. Not required to do
much for the first several years of the mercury trading program, for example, utilities in the Southwest will have little
incentive to clean up mercury in order to generate allowances for their midwestern and eastern counterparts for at
least one and one-half decades.
At that point, it is entirely possible that utilities will protest any requirements that force them to retrofit their existing plants, creating enormous pressure on EPA to relieve
them of this burden, especially if we once more find ourselves in an energy crisis related to instability in the Middle
East. And we do not even need to rely on imagination to predict this outcome, because this scenario is precisely what
happened in California: the SCAQMD set the initial cap on
volatile organic compounds so high that utilities were giving away allowances for free. When the level of the cap began to drop and California found itself in the throes of an energy crisis, utilities were unable to generate allowances by
belatedly installing pollution controls and the price of allowances sky-rocketed out of reach. The SCAQMD was
forced to suspend trading indefinitely.105
Prospects for Hot Spots
In the first installment of this two-part series, we noted on
several occasions that consistency was not the strong suit of
arguments made in defense of EPA’s new approach to power
plant mercury emissions by either the Agency itself or utility industry spokespeople. With regard to the probability
that trading will produce uncontrolled, localized hot spots,
the inconsistencies in the analyses offered by trading advocates are embarrassingly stark. Thus, we have an EPA so
muddled in one context that it cannot set the 2010 cap because it is unsure what reductions will be accomplished by
controls on SO2 and NOx,106 promising in another context
that it “does not expect any local or regional hot spots” to de101. See Schaeffer Letters, supra note 75.
102. Proposed Power Plant Rule, supra note 1, at 4703-04.
103. Proposed Power Plant Rule Supplemental Notice, supra note 1, at
12410.
104. Proposed Power Plant Rule, supra note 1, at 4704.
105. For a description of these events, see Steinzor, supra note 71, at
11427.
106. Proposed Power Plant Rule, supra note 1, at 4698.

velop as a result of unrestricted trading and banking of mercury emissions.107
How can it be so confident? First of all, it has “experience” with the acid rain trading program and no hot spots
developed in that context.108 But SO2, although clearly harmful to public health and the environment, is significantly less
toxic than mercury at relatively low concentrations.
Yet EPA has other arguments up its sleeve:
[M]odeling runs suggest that large coal-fired Utility
Units—those that tend to have relatively high Hg [mercury] emissions—are likely to have larger local deposition footprints than medium-sized and smaller coal-fired
Utility Units. . . . [T]he trading of allowances is likely to
involve large Utility Units controlling their emissions
more than required and selling allowances to smaller
Utility Units rather than the reverse scenario. This prediction arises from the basic economics of capital investment in the utility industry.109

In other words, small sources are more benign because they
produce smaller emissions, and large sources are more
problematic because they produce larger emissions, but
large will control more because of economies of scale, leading to greater reductions in mercury emissions. Again, this
elliptical thinking might coincidentally reflect what will
happen with respect to plants in the East and Midwest,
where SO2 and NOx controls will push mercury emissions
down somewhat by 2010. But those same locations are also
the most threatened by a build-up of mercury contamination. Large portions of the Great Lakes, for example, are so
heavily polluted that even if we start now to eliminate mercury deposition, it would take decades to restore them.110 So
even if eastern and midwestern utilities begin to cut mercury
emissions, the question remains whether they are doing
enough to improve the hot spots that are already there.
Not to worry, EPA tells us, because it has miraculously
managed to assess the precise species of mercury emissions
that will be reduced under its trading proposal. Those species of mercury are much more likely to be deposited locally
than uncontrolled species of mercury emissions that will be
transported to areas far away.111 Therefore, no localized hot
spots will develop as a result of its trading scheme. In other
words, EPA is confident that it has a firm grip on the relationship between sulfur in coal and mercury in coal, and also
understands precisely which species of mercury exist in different types of coal, to the point that it can promise the communities located near such plants that they have nothing to
fear from localized deposition.
Imagine these communities’ dismay, then, were they to
flip back a mere 30 pages or so in EPA’s Federal Register
notice to discover the following remarkable statement:
“Data gathered by EPA indicate that within specific coal
ranks, the Hg [mercury] content can vary significantly and
that lower sulfur content does not necessarily mean lower
Hg [mercury] content.”112 EPA’s confidence that it has a
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 4701
Id. at 4702.
Id.
U.S. EPA, Deposition of Air Pollutants to the Great Waters, Third Report to Congress ii-iii (2000) (EPA 453-R-00005), available at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/oarpg/t3/reports/head_
2kf.pdf.
111. Proposed Power Plant Rule, supra note 1, at 4702.
112. Id. at 4669.
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firm grasp of how sulfur in coal and mercury in coal relate or
what effect control technologies may have on either pollutant evaporates in its multipage discussion of how confounded it feels by the task of setting MACT limits on mercury emissions. Because the Agency is having such difficulty figuring out which are the best performing facilities in any given group of boilers given the variability in the composition
of the coal they burn, it goes so far as to solicit comments
on whether its elaborate calculations or the U.S. Department
of Energy’s alternative calculations are more correct.113
Just in case any skeptic still doubts the reliability of EPA’s
predictions that no hot spots will develop, the Agency
hedges its bets, revealing its own lack of confidence in its
previous analysis. Thus, it offers to consider a modification
that would require “eastern Utility Units in areas of heavy
deposition” to obtain “greater than 1:1 allowances from
Utility Units outside the region to cover an ounce of Hg
[mercury] emissions,” although it reminds utilities to be
sure and explain whether “such adjustments will complicate
and reduce the efficiency of the cap-and-trade program.”114
Neatly flipping the burden onto the public to demonstrate
the inadequacy of its decision to leave people unprotected in
this manner, it also invites commenters to come forward
with any evidence they may have that hot spots will develop.115 Last but not least, it promises to “continue monitoring Hg [mercury] emissions and the operation of the trading system to make sure that localized hot spots do not materialize.”116 However, far from providing any assurance that
it will react promptly to discoveries that hot spots have occurred, EPA announces that it will not reevaluate “emission
levels [and] attendant health risks” until at least 2018.117
“Sound Science” and Trading
Among the most maddening aspects of EPA’s remarkable
bobbing and weaving in this arena are its paradoxical reactions to scientific uncertainty. In the context of whether to
require additional, mercury-specific controls, the Agency
portrays itself as stymied by scientific uncertainty. But in the
context of predicting that no hot spots will develop, EPA
pronounces itself confident that such uncertainty does not
exist. The truth regarding the state of the science is somewhere in between.
Multidisciplinary scientific teams have undertaken ambitious, ground-breaking field work in two locations: the Florida Everglades and a pristine lake in Ontario, Canada.118 Their
preliminary results support the following propositions:
113. Id. at 4674.
114. Id. at 4701.
115. Id. at 4703.
116. Id. at 4702-03.
117. Id. at 4686.
118. Florida Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, Integrating Atmospheric Mercury Deposition With Aquatic Cycling in
South Florida (Oct. 2002, rev. Nov. 2003), available at http://
www.floridadep.org/labs/mercury/docs/flmercury.htm [hereinafter
2003 Florida Mercury Study]; Testimony of Dr. David P. Krabbenhoft, U.S. House of Representatives Subcomm. on Env’t, Technology & Standards of the Comm. on Science, Mercury Emissions: State
of the Science and Technology (Nov. 5, 2003) [hereinafter Krabbenhoft Testimony]. Dr. Krabbenhoft is a lead researcher with the
Mercury Experiment to Assess Atmospheric Loading in Canada and
the United States, which is conducting the work in Canada. For a description of that project, see Rebecca Renner, Follow the Mercury,
35 Envtl. Sci. & Tech. 229 (2001).

· It is indeed difficult, and will require significantly more study, to determine how the different
species of mercury travel through the environment.119
· However, one strongly encouraging development is that newly deposed mercury is generally
more bio-available than residual mercury, making
controls on new deposition more productive than
previously thought.120
· At least with respect to controls on municipal
and medical waste incinerators, which were required to accomplish 90% reductions in mercury
emissions, the local benefits were far more immediate than previously imagined. Levels of contamination in large-mouth bass in the Florida Everglades declined in direct proportion to reductions
of those emissions within a two-year period.121
In sum, while the science is undoubtedly uncertain, an honest evaluation of these emerging findings leads to the exact
opposite of the Administration’s claimed results. The science
fails to provide support for the Agency’s assertion that trading
will not lead to hot spots. Yet the science supports the proposition that stringent controls on local sources translate into
short-term environmental benefits in the same location.
The details of the scientific debate will develop at a fairly
brisk pace as results of the work in Canada and Florida continue to come in. However adamant the Bush Administration is in its determination to wait for “sound” science before it controls industrial pollution, in this as in so many areas of environmental policy, we are unlikely ever to reach a
point where the science is definitive and all outstanding
questions are resolved. Ultimately, science cannot answer
the question that the Bush Administration is at such pains to
avoid. Do electric utilities deserve a regulatory exemption
for the next 20 years as women and children are left with the
sole alternative of eliminating fish from their diets?
Conclusion
For those who have watched the development of environmental policy since the early 1970s, the mercury debate cannot help but instill a strong sense of déjà vu. Twenty years
ago, EPA banned lead in gasoline, rescuing millions of children from irreversible neurological problems. The decision,
which was controversial at the time, is widely regarded as
one of the most important successes EPA has ever achieved.
Not only were the doomsayers proved wrong and the costs
of the ban dwarfed by the value of its benefits, the science on
lead now provides definitive justification for its elimination
from the marketplace.
Mercury is lead’s evil twin, and there are startling similarities between the arguments made against the momentous
decision to ban lead and the arguments now being made in
defense of mercury. At the moment, the debate is stalemated, with the government holding back action but facing
a crescendo of public criticism. We can only hope that the
forward momentum of the law, and the enormous and obvious flaws in the arguments of those who flout it, will overcome that stalemate, setting the stage for another victory on
behalf of our generation and those that follow.
119. See Krabbenhoft Testimony, supra note 118.
120. Id.
121. 2003 Florida Mercury Study, supra note 118.
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